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Abstract—As the second largest cryptocurrency by market
capitalization and today’s biggest decentralized platform that
runs smart contracts, Ethereum has received much attention
from both industry and academia. Nevertheless, there exist
very few studies about the security of its mining strategies,
especially from the selfish mining perspective. In this paper,
we aim to fill this research gap by analyzing selfish mining
in Ethereum and understanding its potential threat. First,
we introduce a 2-dimensional Markov process to model the
behavior of a selfish mining strategy inspired by a Bitcoin
mining strategy proposed by Eyal and Sirer. Second, we derive
the stationary distribution of our Markov model and compute
long-term average mining rewards. This allows us to determine
the threshold of computational power that makes selfish mining
profitable in Ethereum. We find that this threshold is lower
than that in Bitcoin mining (which is 25% as discovered by
Eyal and Sirer), suggesting that Ethereum is more vulnerable
to selfish mining than Bitcoin.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
The Proof-of-Work (PoW) is the most widely adopted
consensus algorithm in blockchain platforms such as Bitcoin
[1] and Ethereum [2]. By successfully solving math puzzles
involving one-way hash functions, the winners of this PoW
competition are allowed to generate new blocks that contain
as many outstanding transactions as possible (up to the block
size limit). As a return, each winner can collect all the
transaction fees and earn a block reward (if its new block is
accepted by other participants). This economic incentive en-
courages participants to contribute their computation power
as much as possible in solving PoW puzzles—a process
often called mining in the literature.
If all the miners follow the mining protocol, each miner
will receive block rewards proportional to its computational
power [1]. Interestingly, if a set of colluding miners deviate
from the protocol to maximize their own profit, they may
obtain a revenue larger than their fair share. Such a behavior
is called selfish mining and has been studied in a seminal
paper by Eyal and Sirer in the context of Bitcoin mining [3].
The selfish mining poses a serious threat to any blockchain
platform adopting PoW. If colluding miners occupy a ma-
jority of the computational power in the system, they can
launch a so-called 51% attack to control the entire system.
Selfish mining in Bitcoin has been well studied with
various mining strategies proposed (e.g., [4]–[6]) and nu-
merous defenses mechanisms suggested (e.g., [7], [8]). In
sharp contrast, selfish mining in Ethereum has not received
much attention. Ethereum differs from Bitcoin in that it
provides the so-called uncle and nephew rewards in addition
to the (standard) block rewards used in Bitcoin [9]. This
complicates the analysis. As a result, most existing research
results on Bitcoin cannot be directly applied to Ethereum.
B. Objective and Contributions
In this paper, we aim to fill this research gap by an-
alyzing selfish mining in Ethereum and understanding its
potential threat. To achieve this goal, we first introduce a
2-dimensional Markov process to model the behavior of a
selfish mining strategy inspired by [3]. We then derive the
stationary distribution of our Markov model and compute
long-term average mining rewards. This allows us to deter-
mine the threshold of computational power which makes
selfish mining profitable in Ethereum. We find that this
threshold is lower than that in Bitcoin. In other words, selfish
mining poses a more serious threat to Ethereum due to the
presence of uncle and nephew rewards. We finally perform
extensive simulations to verify our mathematical results and
obtain several engineering insights.
Although our mining strategy is similar to that proposed
by Eyal and Sirer [3], our analysis is different from theirs
in two aspects. First, our Markov model is 2-dimensional
whereas their model is 1-dimensional. Second, our analysis
tracks block rewards in a probabilistic way whereas their
analysis tracks rewards in a deterministic way. It turns out
that our 2-dimensional model, combined with the probabilis-
tic tracking, enables us to characterize the effect of uncle and
nephew rewards, which is impossible with the 1-dimensional
model and deterministic tracking. The main contributions of
this paper are summarized as follows:
• We develop a mathematical analysis which can capture
the impact of uncle and nephew rewards with selfish
mining in details. We believe that our analysis can
be extended to study more advanced selfish mining
strategies.
• Using our theoretical results, we evaluate the threshold
of making selfish mining profitable under different ver-
sions of Ethereum proposals with a particular focus on
EIP100 (which is adopted by the released Byzantium
[9]). We find that the threshold is lower than that in
Bitcoin, suggesting that Ethereum is more vulnerable
to selfish mining than Bitcoin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides some necessary background for our work. Sec-
tion III introduces a selfish mining strategy for Ethereum
inspired by Eyal and Sirer. Section IV gives the mathemat-
ical analysis and results. Section V presents our simulation
results. Section VI discusses how to improve the security
of Ethereum. Related work are discussed in Section VII.
Finally, Section VIII concludes the paper.
II. A PRIMER ON ETHEREUM
Ethereum is a distributed blockchain-based platform that
runs smart contracts. Roughly speaking, a smart contract is
a set of functions defined in a Turing-complete environment.
The users of Ethereum are called clients. A client can
issue transactions to create new contracts, to send Ether
(internal cryptocurrency of Ethereum) to contracts or to other
clients, or to invoke some functions of a contract. The valid
transactions are collected into blocks; blocks are chained
together through each one containing a cryptographic hash
value of the previous block.
There is no centralized party in Ethereum to authenticate
the blocks and to execute the smart contracts. Instead, a
subset of clients (called miners in the literature) verify
the transactions, generate new blocks, and use the PoW
algorithm to reach consensus, receiving Ethers for their
effort in maintaining the network.
A. Blockchain
Each block in the Ethereum blockchain contains three
components: a block header, a set of transactions, and
some reference links to certain previous blocks called uncle
blocks (whose role will be explained in Sec. III-B) [9]. The
block header includes a Keccak 256-bit hash value of the
previous block, a time stamp and a nonce (whose role will
be explained shortly). See Fig. 1 for an illustration in which
blocks are linked together by the hash references, forming
a chain structure.
Such a chain structure has several desirable features.
First, it is tamper free. Any changes of a block will lead
to subsequent changes of all later blocks in the chain.
Second, it prevents double-spending. All the clients will
eventually have the same copy of the blockchain1 so that
any transactions involving double-spending will be detected
and discarded.
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Figure 1. An illustration of the blockchain structure in Ethereum.
1More precisely, all the clients will have a “common prefix” of the
blockchain [10].
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Figure 2. An illustration of a forked blockchain.
B. PoW and Mining
In order for a miner to produce a new valid block in PoW,
it needs to find a value of the nonce such that the hash value
of the new block is below a certain threshold depending on
the difficulty level—a system parameter that can be adjusted.
This puzzle-solving process is often referred to as mining.
Intuitively, the mining difficulty determines the chance of
finding a new block in each try. By adjusting the mining
difficulty, the blockchain system can maintain a stable chain
growth.
Once a new block is produced, it will be broadcast to the
entire network. In the ideal case, a block will arrive all the
clients before the next block is produced. If this happens
to every block, then each client in the system will have
the same chain of blocks. In reality, the above ideal case
doesn’t always happen. For example, if a miner produces a
new block before he or she receives the previous block, a
fork will occur where two “child” blocks share a common
“parent” block. See Fig. 2 for an illustration. In general,
each client in the system observes a tree of blocks due
to the forking. As a result, each client has to choose a
main chain from the tree according to certain rules (e.g., the
longest chain rule in Bitcoin and the heaviest subtree rule in
the GHOST protocol)2. The common prefix of all the main
chains is called the system main chain—a key concept that
will be used in our analysis.
C. Ethereum Milestones
Ethereum has four milestones: Frontier, Homestead,
Metropolis, and Serenity. We are now in the third milestone
where the mining difficulty level depends not only on the
growth of the system main chain but also on the appearance
of uncle blocks, as suggested in EIP100 which is adopted
by the released Byzantium [9]. By contrast, the mining
difficulty level of Bitcoin only depends on the growth of the
system main chain. Such a difference motivates our work.
2Although Ethereum claimed to apply the heaviest subtree rule [11], it
seems to apply the longest chain rule instead [6].
III. SELFISH MINING ON ETHEREUM
A. Mining Model
In this paper, we consider a system of n miners. The
ith miner has mi fraction of total hash power. Clearly, we
have
∑n
i=1mi = 1. We assume miners are either honest
(those who follow the protocol) or selfish (those who deviate
from the protocol in order to maximize their own profit).
Let S denote the set of selfish miners and H denote the
set of honest miners. Let α denote the fraction of total hash
power controlled by selfish miners and β denote the fraction
of total hash power controlled by honest miners . We have
α =
∑
i∈S mi and β =
∑
i∈Hmi. Clearly, α + β = 1.
Without loss of generality, we assume a single selfish mining
pool with α fraction of hash power.
The PoW mining process can be viewed as a series of
Bernoulli trails, each of which independently finds a valid
nonce to generate a new block with the same probability,
depending on the difficulty level explained in Sec. II-B.
Recall that a Bernoulli process can be approximately by a
Poisson process if the duration of a trail is very short and
the success probability is very low [12]. Both conditions
are held in the context of Bitcoin and Ethereum. Therefore,
we can model the mining process of the ith miner as a
Poisson process with rate fmi. Here, f denotes the block
mining rate of the entire system (e.g., 10 minutes per block
in Bitcoin and 10 − 20 seconds per block in Ethereum).
That is, the ith miner generates new blocks at rate fmi.
Hence, the selfish pool generates blocks at rate fα and the
honest miners generate blocks at rate fβ. This model has
been widely used in the literature. See, e.g., [1], [13], [14].
B. Mining Rewards
There are three types of block rewards in Ethereum,
namely, static block reward, uncle block reward and nephew
block reward [2], [15], as outlined in Table I. The static
reward is used in both Ethereum and Bitcoin. To explain
static reward, we introduce the concepts of regular and stale
blocks. A block is called regular if it is included into the
system main chain, and is called stale block otherwise. Each
regular block in Ethereum can bring its miner a reward of
exactly 3.0 Ethers as an economic incentive.
The uncle and nephew rewards are unique in Ethereum.
An uncle block is a stale block that is a “direct child”
of the system main chain. In other words, the parent of
an uncle block is always a regular block. An uncle block
receives certain reward if it is referenced by some future
regular block, called a nephew block, through the use of
reference links. See Fig. 3 for an illustration of uncle and
nephew blocks. The values of uncle rewards depend on
the “distance” between the uncle and nephew blocks. This
distance is well defined because all the blocks form a tree.
For instance, in Fig. 3, the distance between uncle block B3
(uncle block D2, resp.) and its nephew block is 1 (2, resp.).
Table I
MINING REWARDS IN ETHEREUM AND BITCOIN
Ethereum Bitcoin Purpose
Static Reward X X
Compensate for miners’
mining cost
Uncle Reward X ×
Reduce centralization
trend of mining
Nephew Reward X ×
Encourage miners to
reference uncle blocks
Transaction Fee
(Gas Cost)
X X
Transaction execution;
Resist network attack
1 2
2
2
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Figure 3. Different block types in Ethereum. Here, regular blocks
include {A,B2, C1, D1, E1, F1, G1, H1} and stale blocks include
{B1, B3, C2,D2}. Similarly, uncle blocks are {B1, B3, D2} and
nephew blocks are {C1, F1}. Uncle block B3 (uncle block D2, resp.)
is referenced with distance one (two, resp.).
In Ethereum, if the distance is 1, the uncle reward is 78 of the
(static) block reward; if the distance is 2, the uncle reward
is 68 of the block reward and so on. Once the distance is
greater than 6, the uncle reward will be zero. By contrast,
the nephew reward is always 132 of the block reward. In
addition to blocks rewards, miners can also receive gas cost
as a reward for verifying and executing all the transactions
[2]. However, gas cost is dwarf with other rewards, and so
we ignore it in our analysis.
We use Ks, Ku, and Kn to denote static, uncle, and
nephew rewards, respectively. Without loss of generality, we
assume that Ks = 1 so that Ku (Kn, resp.) represents the
ratio of uncle reward (nephew reward, resp.) to the static
reward. As we explained before, in the current version of
Ethereum, Kn < Ku < 1 and Ku is a function of the
distance. As we will see later, our analysis allows Ku and
Kn to be any functions of the distance.
C. Mining Strategy
We now describe the mining strategies for honest and
selfish miners. The honest miners follow the protocol given
in Sec. II-B. Each honest miner observes a tree of blocks.
It chooses a main chain from the tree and mines new
blocks on its main chain. Once a new block is produced,
the miner broadcasts the block to everyone in the system.
Also, it includes as many reference links as possible to
(unreferenced) uncle blocks in the tree.
By contrast, the selfish pool can withhold its newly mined
blocks and publish them strategically to maximize its own
A B2 D2 E2
B1 C E1D1 F G
Selfish miners' secret block
Selfish miners' published block
Honest miners' block
Figure 4. An example to illustrate private branch length and public branch
length.
revenue. The basic idea behind selfish mining is to increase
the selfish pool’s share of static rewards and, at the same
time, to gain as many uncle and nephew rewards as possible.
Specifically, the selfish pool keeps its newly discovered
blocks private, creating a fork on purpose. The pool then
continues to mine on this private branch, while honest miners
still mine on public branches (which are often shorter than
the private branch).
Fig. 4 gives an example in which “circle” blocks are
mined by the pool and “square” blocks are mined by honest
miners. In this example, the private branch consists of 4
blocks (D1, E1, F,G), all of which are mined by the pool
with (D1, E1) published and (F,G) still private. There
are two public branches, namely, (D1, E1) and (D2, E2),
because honest miners can see both branches. Each honest
miner then chooses one public branch to mine new blocks
according to certain rules (e.g., the longest chain rule).
Here, the two public branches are of equal length. This
is not a coincidence. In fact, we can show that public
branches always have the same length under our selfish
mining strategy.
Let Ls(t) be the length of the private branch seen by
the selfish pool at time t. Similarly, let Lh(t) be the length
of public branches seen by honest miners at time t. (Note
that Lh(t) is well defined because all public branches have
the same length.) We are now ready to describe our selfish
mining strategy which is based on the strategy in [3].
Algorithm 1 presents the mining strategy. When the selfish
pool mines a new block (see lines 1 to 7), it will keep this
block private and continue mining on its private branch until
its advantage is very limited (i.e., (Ls, Lh) = (2, 1)) which
will be discussed later.
When some honest miners mine a new block, the length
of a public branch will be increased by 1. We have the
following cases. Case 1) If the new public branch is longer
than the private branch, the pool will adopt the public branch
and mine on it. (That is why the pool will set (Ls, Lh) =
(0, 0).) Case 2) If the new public branch has the same length
as the private branch, the pool will publish its private block
immediately hoping that as many honest miners will choose
its private branch as possible (since honest miners will see
two branches of the same length when the private branch
is published). Case 3) If the new public branch is shorter
Algorithm 1 An selfish Mining Strategy in Ethereum
on The selfish pool mines a new block
1: reference all (unreferenced) uncle blocks based on its
private branch
2: Ls ← Ls + 1
3: if (Ls, Lh) = (2, 1) then
4: publish its private branch
5: (Ls, Lh) ← (0, 0) (since all the miners achieve a
consensus)
6: else
7: keep mining on its private branch
on Some honest miners mine a new block
8: The miner references all (unreferenced) uncle blocks
based on its public branches
9: Lh ← Lh + 1
10: if Ls < Lh then
11: (Ls, Lh)← (0, 0)
12: keep mining on this new block
13: else if Ls = Lh then
14: publish the last block of the private branch
15: else if Ls = Lh + 1 then
16: publish its private branch
17: (Ls, Lh) ← (0, 0) (since all the miners achieve a
consensus)
18: else
19: publish first unpublished block in its private branch
20: set (Ls, Lh) = (Ls −Lh + 1, 1) if the new block is
mined on a public branch that is a prefix of the private
branch
than the private branch by just 1, the pool will publish its
private branch so that all the honest miners will adopt the
private branch. Case 4) If the new public branch is shorter
than the private branch by at least 2, the pool will publish
the first unpublished block since the pool still has a clear
advantage. Moreover, if the new block is mined on a public
branch that is a prefix of the private branch, the pool will set
(Ls, Lh) = (Ls − Lh + 1, 1) due to a new forking (caused
by the honest miner).
To better illustrate the selfish mining strategy, we provide
an example in Fig. 5. In Step 1, we have (Ls, Lh) = (3, 0).
In Step 2, some honest miner publishes block A2 and
we have (Ls, Lh) = (3, 1). This corresponds to Case 4).
Hence, the pool immediately publishes blockA1, still having
an advantage of 2 blocks. In Step 3, some honest miner
publishes block B2, leading to (Ls, Lh) = (3, 2). This
corresponds to Case 3). Thus, the pool publishes its private
branch, making honest miners’ blocks (A2 and B2) stale.
Remark 1. The selfish mining strategy presented above isn’t
necessarily optimal. By studying its behavior, we hope to re-
veal some characteristics of the selfish mining in Ethereum.
D. Mining Pool
In Ethereum, individual miners can form mining pools
to mine blocks together and share the revenue according
to individuals’ hash power. Fig. 6 presents the fractions of
the hash power of various mining pools in Ethereum [16].
The largest mining pool (called Ethermine) has dominated
26.34% of the total hash power. The top two mining pools
have dominated 48.8% of the total hash power. The top five
mining pools have more than 81% of the total hash power.
Although these mining pools are not necessarily selfish, their
presence motivates us to understand the impact of selfish
mining in Ethereum.
IV. ANALYSIS OF SELFISH MINING
In this section, we will study the long-term behavior of
the selfish mining strategy using a Markov model with a
particular focus on the mining revenue.
A. Network Model
To simplify our analysis, we follow the network model
of [3], [4], [6] which assumes that the time it takes to
broadcast a block is negligible. In particular, we introduce
the same parameter γ as in [3], which denotes the ratio of
honest miners that are mining on blocks produced by the
selfish pool (rather than by the honest miners) whenever
they observe a fork of two branches of equal length. For
example, if the honest miners apply the uniform tie-breaking
rule (when they observe a fork of two branches of equal
length), then γ = 12 . On the other hand, if the pool can
launch a network attack to influence honest miners’ block
propagation, then only a few honest miners can see any
new block produced by some honest miner. In this case,
the parameter γ is close to 1. Therefore, the parameter γ
captures the pool’s communication capability. In this paper,
we assume that γ takes values in the interval [0, 1].
B. Markov Process
For ease of presentation, we re-scale the time axis so that
the selfish pool generates new blocks at rate α and the honest
miners generate new blocks at rate β. We are now ready to
define the system state. Recall that Ls(t) is the length of the
private branch and Lh(t) is the length of the public branches
at time t. Clearly, (Ls(t), Lh(t)) captures the system state at
time t. The state space contains the following states: (0, 0),
(1, 0), (1, 1), as well as (i, j) with i − j ≥ 2 and j ≥ 0.
It is easy to verify that (Ls(t), Lh(t)) evolves as a Markov
process under our selfish mining strategy and the network
model, as illustrated in Fig. 7. Moreover, we can show that
the process (Ls(t), Lh(t)) is positive recurrent and so it has
a unique stationary distribution.
C. The Stationary Distribution
To compute the stationary distribution of the process
(Ls(t), Lh(t)), we need to derive the transition rates for the
state evolution. The results are provided below.
• q(0,0),(0,0) = β
This transition happens if any honest miner produces a
new block, broadcasts it to everyone. Then, the selfish
pool adopts the public branch and mines on it. Thus,
the rate is β.
• q(0,0),(1,0) = α
This transition happens if the pool produces a new
block and keeps it private. Thus, the rate is α.
• q(1,0),(2,0) = α
This transition happens if the pool produces a new
block and keeps it private. Thus, the rate is α.
• q(1,0),(1,1) = β
This transition happens if any honest miner produces
a new block and the pool immediately publishes its
private block (because the new public branch has the
same length as the private branch). Thus, the rate is β.
• q(1,1),(0,0) = α+ β = 1
This transition happens if any of the following events
happens. 1) The pool produces a new block and pub-
lishes its private branch (because (Ls, Lh) = (2, 1)); 2)
Any honest miner produces a new block and the pool
has to publish its private branch (because Ls = Lh+1).
Thus, the rate is α+ β = 1.
• q(i,j),(i+1,j) = α for i ≥ 2 and j ≥ 0
This transition happens if the pool produces a new
block and keeps it private. Thus, the rate is α.
• q(i,j),(i−j,1) = βγ for i− j ≥ 3 and j ≥ 1
This transition happens if any honest miner mines a
new block on a public branch which is a prefix of the
private branch. Then, the pool publishes a private block
accordingly. Thus, the rate is βγ.
• q(i,j),(0,0) = β for i − j = 2 and j ≥ 1
This transition happens if any honest miner produces a
new block and then the pool publishes its private branch
(because Ls = Lh + 1). Thus, the rate is β.
• q(2,0),(0,0) = β
This transition happens if any honest miner produces a
new block and then the pool publishes its private branch
(because Ls = Lh + 1). Thus, the rate is β.
• q(i,0),(i,1) = β for i ≥ 3
This transition happens if any honest miner produces a
new block and the pool publishes a private block. Thus,
the rate is β.
• q(i,j),(i,j+1) = β(1 − γ) for i− j ≥ 3 and j ≥ 1
This transition happens if any honest miner mines a
new block on a public branch which is not a prefix of
the private branch. Thus, the rate is β(1− γ).
Let {pii,j} be the steady-state distribution of the Markov
process (Ls(t), Lh(t)). Then, the set {pii,j} satisfies the
Selfish miners' secret block
B1 C1A1 B1 C2A1
A2
Honest miners' block
B1 C1A1
B2A2
Selfish miner's published block
a) Step 1: selfish pool withholds 3 blocks b) Step 2: selfish pool publishes 1 block b) Step 3: selfish pool overrides 2 blocks
Figure 5. A simple example of the mining strategy.
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Figure 6. The top 5 mining pools’ hash power in Ethereum (2018.09).
following global balance equations according to the above
transition rates.


αpi0,0 = pi1,1 + β
∑∞
j=0 pi2+j,j ,
pi1,1 = βpi1,0,
pi3,1 = βpi3,0 +
∑∞
j=1 βγpi3+j,j ,
pii,0 = αpii−1,0, for i ≥ 1,
pii,1 = βpii,0 + αpii−1,1 +
∑∞
j=1 βγpii+j,j , for i ≥ 4,
pii,i−2 = β (1− γ)pii,i−1, for i ≥ 4,
pii,j = αpii−1,j + β (1− γ)pii,j−1, for j ≥ 2, i ≥ 5.
(1)
Solving the global balance equations, we obtain the fol-
lowing results for the stationary distribution:
pi0,0 =
1− 2α
2α3 − 4α2 + 1
,
pii,0 = α
ipi0,0 for i ≥ 1,
pi1,1 =
(
α− α2
)
pi0,0,
pii,j = α
i (1− α)
j
(1− γ)
j
f(i, j, j)pi0,0+
αi−jγ (1− γ)
j−1
(
1
(1− α)
i−j−1 − 1
)
pi0,0−
γ (1− γ)
j−1
j∑
k=1
αi−k (1− α)
j−k
f(i, j, j − k)pi0,0
for i ≥ j + 2 and j ≥ 1, where the function f(x, y, z) is
defined as
f(x, y, z) =


x∑
sz=y+2
sz∑
sz−1=y+1
..
s2∑
s1=y−z+3︸ ︷︷ ︸
z
1, z ≥ 1, x ≥ y + 2,
0, otherwise.
(2)
The function f(x, y, z) is a multiple summations. See Ap-
pendix A for some concrete examples.
We have the following remarks for the stationary distri-
bution in Equation (2).
Remark 2. When 0 < α < 12 , we have 0 < pi0,0 < 1.
Specifically, the distribution pi0,0 only depends on the pa-
rameter α and is monotonically decreasing. The tendency
of pi0,0 suggests that with more hash power, the selfish pool
can obtain more lead blocks and so stay in state (0, 0) less
frequently.
Remark 3. The distributions pii,0 with i ≥ 1 are decreasing
geometrically and are less than 10−6 when i ≥ 15 when
α = 0.4. It suggests that we can truncate the states in the
numerical calculation.
D. Reward Analysis
In this subsection, we conduct reward analysis for each
state transition. Our analysis differs from the previous analy-
sis (e.g., [3], [5]) in that we track various block rewards in a
probabilistic way. Recall that each state transition induces a
new block (mined by a honest miner or the pool). In general,
it is impossible to decide the amount of rewards associated
with this new block when it is just created, because the
“destiny” of this new block depends on the evolution of
the system. For this reason, we will instead compute the
expected rewards for the new block. In contrast, the previous
analysis tracks published blocks associated with a state
transition (whose destiny is already determined) rather than
the new block and so it can compute the exact rewards. This
gives rise to the following two questions.
1) What is wrong with tracking published blocks?
2) How shall we compute the expected rewards for a new
block at the time of its creation?
To answer the first question, one shall notice that track-
ing published blocks doesn’t provide enough information
to compute the uncle and nephew rewards. Recall from
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Figure 7. The Markov process of the selfish mining in Ethereum.
Sec. III-B that a published regular block can receive
nephew rewards by referencing outstanding uncle blocks.
The amount of nephew rewards depends on the number of
outstanding uncle blocks. As such, we need to keep track
of all the outstanding uncle blocks in the system together
with their depth information (which is needed to determine
the amount of uncle rewards). This greatly complicates the
state space.
To answer the second question, one shall notice that it
suffices to compute the expected rewards for a new block
by using the following information: the probability that it
becomes a regular block, the probability that it becomes an
uncle block, the distance to its potential nephew block (if it
indeed becomes an uncle block). Perhaps a bit surprisingly,
all the information can be determined when this new block
is generated for our selfish mining strategy.
The complete analysis is provided in Appendix B for
a better presentation flow. Here, we just provide a simple
example to illustrate our analysis. Assume that the selfish
pool has already mined two blocks and kept them private at
time t. Then, some honest miner generates a new block.
According to Algorithm 1, the pool publishes its private
branch immediately. As such, this new block will become
an uncle block with probability 1. Furthermore, we can
show that this block will have a distance of 2 with its
potential nephew block. Thus, this new block will receive
an uncle reward of Ku(2). Similarly, its potential nephew
block will receive a nephew reward ofKn(2). Moreover, this
reward will belong to some honest miner with probability
β(1 + αβ(1 − γ)) and belong to the pool with probability
1 − β(1 + αβ(1 − γ)). (See Case 7 in Appendix B for
details.) Therefore, the expected rewards associated with
this new block are Ku(2) + Kn(2) in total among which
Ku(2) + Kn(2)β(1 + αβ(1 − γ)) rewards will belong to
honest miners (and the remaining will belong to the pool).
E. Revenue Analysis
In this subsection, we apply the previous reward analysis
to compute various rewards received by the selfish pool and
honest miners. This calculation is straightforward.
1) Revenue Computing: First, we compute the static
block rewards for the selfish pool (denoted as rsb ) and honest
miners (denoted as rhb ). We have the following results:
rsb =
(
α(1 − pi0,0) + (α
2 + α2β + αβ2γ)pi0,0
)
= α− αβ2(1− γ)pi0,0,
=
α(1− α)2(4α+ γ(1− 2α))− α3
2α3 − 4α2 + 1
(3)
and
rhb = β(pi0,0 + pi1,1) + β
2(1− γ)pi1,0
=
(1 − 2α)(1− α)(α(1 − α)(2 − γ) + 1)
2α3 − 4α2 + 1
.
(4)
Note that rsb and r
h
b represent the long-term average static
rewards per time unit. Since all the miners generate new
blocks at rate 1, the maximum long-term average reward is
1 per time unit. Hence, we have rsb + r
h
b ≤ 1.
Remark 4. If we only consider static rewards, the above
results are the same as those in [3], though our approach
is different from that in [3].
Next, we can compute the uncle block rewards for the
selfish pool (denoted as rsu):
rsu = αβ
2(1− γ)Ku(1)pi0,0
=
(1− 2α)(1 − α)2α(1− γ)
2α3 − 4α2 + 1
Ku(1).
(5)
Remark 5. Note that rsu is zero in Bitcoin. In other word,
selfish pools’ blocks without rewards can be viewed as
the “cost” of launching selfish mining attack. Thus the
additional reward in Ethereum will reduce the cost of selfish
mining and make it easier. Moreover, as shown in our reward
analysis, the uncle blocks of the pool are always referenced
with distance 1—the minimum referencing distance possible
in the system. Intuitively, this is because the pool has a
global view of the system.
Similarly, we can compute the uncle block rewards for
the honest miners (denoted as rhu):
rhu = (αβ + β
2γ)Ku(1)pi1,0 +
∞∑
i=2
βKu(i)pii,0+
+
∞∑
i=2
∞∑
j=1
βγKu(i)pii+j,j . (6)
Remark 6. In the current version of Ethereum, the function
Ku(·) is given below:
Ku(l) =
{
(8− l)/8, 1 ≤ l ≤ 6
0, otherwise.
(7)
Our analysis applies to an arbitrary function of Ku(·).
Then, we can compute the nephew block rewards for the
selfish pool (denoted as rsn) and honest miners (denoted as
rhn):
rsn = αβKs(1)pi1,0+
∞∑
i=2
∞∑
j=1
βi−1γ(α−αβ2(1−γ))Ks(i)pii+j,j
(8)
rhn = αβ
2(1− γ)Ks(1)pi0,0 + β
2γKs(1)pi1,0+
+
∞∑
i=2
∞∑
j=1
βiγ(1 + αβ(1 − γ))Ks(i)pii+j,j . (9)
Remark 7. In the current version of Ethereum, the function
Kn(·) is always equal to
1
32 . Our analysis applies to an
arbitrary function of Kn(·).
Finally, we can obtain the total mining revenue rtotal as
rtotal = r
s
b + r
h
b + r
s
u + r
h
u + r
s
n + r
h
n. (10)
Hence,
Rs =
rsb + r
s
u + r
s
n
rtotal
gives the share of the mining revenue by the selfish pool.
2) Absolute Revenue: We now define the absolute rev-
enue Us for the selfish pool. As we will soon see, although
the absolute revenue is equivalent to the relative revenue
(i.e., the share Rs) in Bitcoin, it is different from the relative
revenue in Ethereum due to the presence of uncle and
nephew rewards.
Recall that Bitcoin adjusts the mining difficulty level so
that the regular blocks are generated at a stable rate, say
1 block per time unit. Thus, the long-term average total
revenue is fixed to be 1 block reward per time unit with or
without selfish mining. This makes the absolution revenue
equivalent to the relative revenue. The situation is different in
Ethereum. Even if the regular blocks are generated at a stable
rate, the average total revenue still depends on the generation
rate of uncle blocks, which is affected by selfish mining
as we will see shortly. Indeed, Ethereum didn’t take into
account the generation rate of uncle blocks when adjusting
the difficulty level until its third milestone. This motivates
us to consider two scenarios in our analysis: 1) the regular
block generation rate is 1 block per time unit, and 2) the
regular and uncle block generation rate is 1 block per time
unit.
In our previous analysis, the regular block generation rate
is rsb + r
h
b , which is smaller than 1 as explained before.
Thus, we can re-scale the time to make the regular block
generation rate to be 1 block per time unit. In this scenario,
the long-term absolute revenue for the selfish pool is
Us =
rsb + r
s
u + r
s
n
rsb + r
h
b
, (11)
and the long-term absolute revenue for honest miners is
Uh =
rhb + r
h
u + r
h
n
rsb + r
h
b
. (12)
Similarly, we can re-scale the time to make the regular
and uncle block generation rate to be 1 block per time unit
and define long-term absolute revenues for the selfish pool
and honest miners accordingly.
3) Threshold Analysis: First of all, if the selfish pool
follows the mining protocol, its long-term average absolute
revenue will be α, since the network delay is negligible (and
so no stale blocks will occur). On the other hand, if the pool
applies the selfish mining strategy proposed in this paper,
its long-term absolute revenue is given by Us, which can be
larger than α.
Let α∗ be the smallest value such that Us ≥ α. That is, α
∗
is the threshold of computational power that makes selfish
mining profitable in Ethereum. We can determine α∗ for
both scenarios through numerical calculations. The details
will be presented in the next section.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we build an Ethereum selfish mining
simulator to validate our theoretical analysis. In particular,
we simulate a system with n = 1000 miners, each with the
same block generation rate. In our simulations, the selfish
pool controls at most 450 miners (i.e., α ≤ 0.45) and
runs our Algorithm 1, while the honest miners follow the
designed protocol in Sec. III-C. Our simulation results are
based on an average of 10 runs, where each run generates
100, 000 blocks.
A. Validation of the Theory Results
In this subsection, we validate the long-term average ab-
solute revenues for the selfish pool and honest miners. Fig. 8
plots the results obtained from analysis and simulations.
From the results, we can see when γ = 0.5, Ku = 4/8Ks
and α changes from 0 to 0.45, the simulation results match
our theoretical results3. In addition, when α is above 0.163,
the selfish pool can always gain higher revenue from selfish
mining than following the protocol. More importantly, when
α is below the threshold 0.163, the selfish pool loses just a
small amount of revenue due to the additional uncle block
rewards, which is quite different from the results in Bitcoin
[3].
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Figure 8. Revenue rate for the selfish pool and honest miners when
γ = 0.5, Ku = 4/8Ks and α changes from 0 to 0.45.
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Figure 9. Revenue rate for the selfish pool, honest miners under
different uncle block reward Ku.
3To simplify the numerical calculations of our results, we only consider
the states (i, j) with i and j less than 200. This approximation turns out
to be accurate when α ≤ 0.45.
B. Impact of the Uncle Reward
In this subsection, we explore the impact of the uncle
block rewards on the selfish pool’s and honest miners’
revenues. To this end, we first use the uncle reward function
Ku(·) in Ethereum (see Sec. IV-E for details) and then set
the uncle reward as a fixed value regardless of the distance,
ranging from 2/8Ks to 7/8Ks. Here, the fixed uncle re-
ward value can directly show its impacts and simplify our
understanding.
Fig. 9 shows that the higher uncle reward, the more
absolute revenue for both the selfish pool and honest miners,
which is quite intuitive. It also reveals that the total revenue
increases with the selfish pool’s computation power α and
soars to 135% of the revenue without selfish mining, when
Ku = 7/8Ks and α = 0.45. This is because, without the
consideration of uncle blocks into difficulty adjustment, the
selfish mining can produce additional uncle and nephew
rewards, resulting in the fluctuation of total revenue. Addi-
tionally, the uncle reward function Ku(·) used in Ethereum
has the same effect as simply settingKu = 7/8Ks for selfish
pool’s revenue (as explained in Sec. IV-E). In contrast,Ku(·)
functions complicatedly for the honest miners’ revenue.
When α is small, its impact is similar to the case of
Ku = 7/8Ks, and when α is close to 0.45, its impact is
similar to the case of Ku = 4/8Ks. This is because with
the increase of α, the average referencing distances of honest
miners’ uncle blocks will increase, which further leads to
the decrease of honest miners’ average uncle rewards when
using function Ku(·). This finding motivates our discussion
in Sec. VI.
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Figure 10. The profitable threshold of hash power in Bitcoin and
Ethereum.
C. Comparison with Bitcoin
In this subsection, we compare the hash power thresh-
olds of making selfish mining profitable in Ethereum and
Bitcoin under different values of γ. In Ethereum, we use
function Ku(·) to compute the uncle rewards. Particularly,
we compute the thresholds for the two scenarios described
in Sec. IV-E2: 1) the regular block generation rate is 1 block
per time unit, and 2) the regular and uncle block generation
rate is 1 block per time unit.
From Fig. 10, we can see that the higher γ is, the lower
hash power needed for a profitable selfish mining. Specially,
when γ = 1, the selfish mining in Bitcoin and Ethereum can
always be profitable regardless of their hash power. Besides
that, the results show that the hash power thresholds of
Ethereum in scenario 1 are always lower than Bitcoin. By
contrast, the hash power thresholds in scenario 2 are higher
than Bitcoin when γ ≥ 0.39. This is because the larger
γ is, the more blocks mined by honest miners are uncle
blocks. However, in scenario 2 the additional referenced
uncle blocks will reduce the generation rate of regular block,
resulting in the decrease of selfish pools’ block rewards.
Thus the selfish pool needs to have higher hash power in
order to make selfish mining profitable. This suggests that
Ethereum should consider the uncle blocks into the difficulty
adjustment under the mining strategy given in Algorithm 1.
VI. DISCUSSION
In Ethereum, uncle and nephew rewards are initially
designed to solve the mining centralization bias—miners
form or join in some big mining pools (Sec. III-D). This
is because, due to propagation delay, mining pools with
huge hash power are less likely to generated stale blocks
and can be more profitable for mining. Thus, rewarding the
stale block can reduce the mining pools’ advantage [17]
and make them less attractive for small miners. However, as
analyzed previously, the uncle reward (computed by using
the function Ku(·)) can greatly reduce the cost of launching
selfish mining. To mitigate this issue, here we propose a
simple uncle reward function motivated by our analysis in
Sec. IV-E1. It shows that the uncle blocks mined by the
selfish pool can always be referenced with block distance
one, i.e., the maximum uncle reward 7/8Ks using the
function Ku(·). In contrast, the honest miners’ uncle blocks
cannot obtain such high reward. To illustrate the explicit
situation, we provide the distribution of the honest miners’
uncle block with different referencing block distances in
Table II given γ = 0.5. The results show that with the
increase of α, the average referencing distance of honest
miners’ blocks are increasing. Thus, we should decrease
the reward for uncle blocks with distance one and increase
the reward for the uncle blocks with longer distances. In
particular, we can simply set the uncle reward function
Ku(·)) as a fixed value, say Ku = 4/8Ks, if uncle blocks’
referencing block distance is between 1 and 6. We recompute
the threshold of making selfish mining profitable using this
new function and find that when γ = 0.5, the threshold
increases from 0.054 to 0.163 in scenario 1, and from 0.270
to 0.356 in scenario 2. In other words, this simple change
makes it harder for the selfish pool to be profitable.
Table II
THE DISTRIBUTION OF HONEST MINERS’ UNCLE BLOCK WITH
DIFFERENT REFERENCING BLOCK DISTANCES
Referencing distance α = 0.3 α = 0.45
1 0.527 0.284
2 0.295 0.249
3 0.111 0.171
4 0.043 0.125
5 0.017 0.096
6 0.007 0.075
Expectation 1.75 2.72
VII. RELATED WORK
The research of selfish mining is mostly focused on
Bitcoin with roughly two directions: 1) optimizing the selfish
mining strategies in order to increase the revenue and lower
the threshold of launching selfish mining attacks; 2) propos-
ing defense mechanisms. In [3], Eyal and Sirer developed
a Markov process to model the Selfish-Mine Strategy and
to evaluate the selfish pool’s relative revenue. Moreover,
they proposed a uniform tie-breaking defense against selfish
mining, which is adopted in Ethereum. Inspired by this
seminal paper, Sapirshtein et al. [4] and Nayak et al. [5]
demonstrated that by adopting the optimized strategies, the
threshold of the hashing power to make selfish mining
profitable can be reduced to 23.2% even when honest miners
adopt the uniform tie-breaking defense. Furthermore, the
authors in [18] took the propagation delay into the analysis
of selfish mining.
As for defense mechanisms, Heilman proposed a defense
mechanism called Freshness Preferred [8], in which by using
the latest unforgeable timestamp issued by a trusted party,
the threshold can be increased to 32%. Bahack in [19]
introduced a fork-punishment rule to make selfish mining
unprofitable. Specially, each miner in the system can include
a fork evidence in their block. Once confirmed, the miner can
get half of the total rewards of the wining branch. Solat and
Potop-Butucaru [20] propose a solution called ZeroBlock,
which can make selfish miners’ block expire and be rejected
by all the honest miners without using forgeable times-
tamps. In [7], the authors proposed a backward-compatible
defense mechanism called weighted FRP which considers
the weights of the forked chains instead of their lengths.
This is similar in spirit to the GHOST protocol [11].
There exist very few studies about the selfish mining in
Ethereum. The work by Gervais et al. [6] is among the first to
develop a quantitative framework to analyze selfish mining
as well as double-spending in various PoW blockchains.
Particularly, they developed optimal selfish-mining strategies
for various PoW blockchains. However, their work didn’t
consider general functions of uncle and nephew rewards.
Instead, they focused on a special case when the uncle
reward is always 78 of the block reward. The author in [21]
proposed to exploit the flaw of difficulty adjustment to mine
additional uncle blocks, which is shown less profitable than
our selfish mining strategy. In [22] Ritz and Zugenmaier built
a Monte Carlo simulation platform to quantify the security of
the Ethereum after EIP100. However, their paper contains
no mathematical analysis and cannot directly capture the
effects of uncle block rewards and nephew rewards.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have proposed a Markov model to
analyze a selfish mining strategy in Ethereum. Our model
enables us to evaluate the impact of the uncle and nephew
rewards, which is generally missing in the previous anal-
ysis for selfish mining in Bitcoin. In particular, we have
shown how these rewards influence the security of Ethereum
mining. Additionally, we have computed the hashing power
threshold of making selfish mining profitable under different
scenarios, which is essential for us to evaluate the security
of Ethereum mining and to design new reward functions.
As one of our major findings, we notice that it is important
to consider uncle blocks when adjusting the mining difficulty
level. Otherwise, Ethereum would be much more vulnerable
to selfish mining than Bitcoin. This finding supports the
emendation adopted by the third milestone of Ethereum.
However, once the mining mechanism is changed, the selfish
pool is likely to change its new mining strategies in order to
maximize its own profit. We leave the design of new mining
strategies as our future work. We believe that our analysis
developed in this paper (especially the probabilistic tracking)
would be useful in studying other mining strategies.
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APPENDIX
A. The Multiple Summations Function
The function f(x, y, z) used in Sec. IV-C involves multi-
ple summations when z > 1. We provide several examples
to explain this function.
Example 1 (z = 1, x ≥ y + 2).
f(x, y, 1) =
x∑
s1=y+2
1
= x− y − 1.
Example 2 (z = 2, x ≥ y + 2).
f(x, y, 2) =
x∑
s2=y+2
s2∑
s1=y+1
1
=
x∑
s2=y+2
(s2 − y)
= 2 + · · ·+ (x− y)
=
(x − y − 1)(x− y + 2)
2
.
B. Reward Analysis
Lemma 1. Consider a new block associated with a state
transition from state (i, j) with i−j ≥ 2. It will be a regular
block with probability 1 if and only if it is mined by the
selfish pool.
Proof: Suppose that the current system state is (i, j)
with i − j ≥ 2. If the selfish pool mines a new block, then
the state becomes (i+1, j). Now, the private branch has an
advantage of at least 3 blocks (since i+1−j ≥ 3) over public
branches. As the system evolves, the private branch will be
published with probability 1 and become part of the system
main chain, according to Algorithm 1. In other words, the
new block will be a regular block with probability 1. On
the other hand, if some honest miners mine a new block,
we consider two cases.
1) i − j = 2. In this case, we have Lh = j + 1 and
Ls = Lh + 1. Hence, the pool will publish its private
branch and the new block becomes a stale block.
2) i − j ≥ 3. In this case, the system state becomes
either (i, j+1) or (i−j, 1). The private branch has an
advantage of at least 3 blocks (since i−j ≥ 3). Hence,
it will be published with probability 1. In other words,
the new block will be a stale block with probability 1.
We are now ready to analyze every state transition. We
call a new block associated with a transition a target block.
Case 1: (0, 0)
β
→ (0, 0)
In this case, the target block generated by some honest
miners will be adopted by all the miners. Thus, it will be a
regular block and receive a static reward Ks.
Case 2: (0, 0)
α
→ (1, 0)
In this case, the selfish pool produces the target block,
keeps it private, and continues mining on it. First, we analyze
the static reward by determining whether the target block
will be a regular block or not. To this end, we consider the
following two subcases, which are illustrated in Fig. 11.
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Figure 11. The two subcases of Case 1: 1) the selfish pool mines a
subsequent block; 2) some honest miners mine a new block.
1) Subcase 1: The subsequent block is mined by the pool,
which happens with probability α. As a result, the
pool owns a lead of two blocks. By Lemma 1, the
target block will be a regular block and receive a static
reward of Ks.
2) Subcase 2: The subsequent block is mined by some
honest miner, which happens with probability β. Then,
the pool will publish this target block. To determine
whether it will be a regular block, we need to consider
the following three subsubcases. See Fig. 12 for an
illustration.
Subsubcase 1: The pool mines a new block on its
private branch and publishes it immediately. (This
happens with probability α.) Now, the target block
becomes a regular block.
Selfish miners' secret block
Selfish miners' published block
Honest miners' block
Case 1: Subsubcase 1 Case 1: Subsubcase 3
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Figure 12. The three subsubcases of Case 1: 1) the selfish pool mines a
new block and publishes it; 2) the honest miners find a new block on the
target block; 3) some honest miners mine a new block and reference the
target block.
Subsubcase 2: Some honest miners mine a new block
on the target block. (This happens with probability
βγ.) Now, the target block becomes a regular block.
Subsubcase 3: Some honest miners mine a new block
and references the target block. (This happens with
probability β(1− γ).) Now, the target block becomes
an uncle block.
To sum up, the target block in Case 2 will eventually be
a regular block with probability α + αβ + β2γ and be an
uncle block with probability β2(1−γ). (Note that these two
probabilities sum up to 1.)
Next, we analyze the uncle and nephew rewards associ-
ated with the target block. Based on our previous case-by-
case discussion, only in subsubcase 3, the target block will
be an uncle block. Also, the distance between the target
block and its nephew block is 1. As such, the target block
will bring the pool an uncle reward of Ku(1) and some
honest miners will receive a nephew reward of Kn. (This
happens with probability β2(1− γ).)
Case 3: (1, 0)
α
→ (2, 0)
In this case , the pool produces the target block, keeps it
private, and continues mining on it. By Lemma 1, the target
block will be a regular block and receive a static reward of
Ks.
Case 4: (1, 0)
β
→ (1, 1)
In this case, some honest miners mine the target block,
then the pool publishes its private block. First, we analyze
the static reward by determining whether the target block
is a regular block. To this end, we consider the following
subcases. See Fig. 13 for an illustration.
1) Subcase 1: The pool mines a new block on its private
branch, references the target block, and publishes its
private branch. (This happens with probability α.)
Now, the target block becomes an uncle block.
2) Subcase 2: Some honest miners mine a new block
not on the target block and reference the target block.
(This happens with probability βγ.) Now, the target
block becomes an uncle block.
3) Subcase 3: Some honest miners mine a new block
on the target block. (This happens with probability
β(1 − γ).) Now, the target block becomes a regular
block.
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Figure 13. The three subcases of Case 4: 1) the selfish pool mines a new
block on its branch and references the target block; 2) some honest miners
find a new block not on the target block and reference the target block; 3)
some honest miners mine a new block on the target block.
To sum up, the target block will eventually be a regular
block with probability β(1−γ), and be an uncle block with
probability α+ βγ.
Next, we analyze the uncle and nephew rewards associ-
ated with the target block. Based on our previous case-by-
case discussion, the target block will become an uncle block
only in subcases 1 and 2, where the distance is 1. Thus, the
target block will bring honest miners an uncle reward of
Ku(1). As for the nephew reward, in Subcase 1, the pool
receives it, and in Subcase 2, some honest miners receive
it. To sum up, honest miners will receive an uncle block
reward of Ku(1) with probability α+βγ, receive a nephew
reward of Kn with probability βγ, and the pool will receive
a nephew reward of Kn with probability α.
Case 5: (1, 1)
1
→ (0, 0)
In this case, the target block will always be a regular
block no matter who mines it. Hence, the pool receives a
static reward with probability α, and some honest miners
receive a static reward with probability β.
Case 6: (i, j)
α
→ (i + 1, j) with i ≥ 2 and j ≥ 0
In this case , the pool mines the target block, keeps it
private, and continues mining. By Lemma 1, the target block
will eventually become a regular block, receiving a static
reward of Ks.
Case 7: (i, j)
βγ
→ (i − j, 1) with i− j ≥ 3 and j ≥ 1
In this case, some honest miners mine the target block on
a public branch that is a prefix of the private branch. Then,
the pool publishes its first unpublished block. By Lemma 1,
the target block will eventually become an uncle block.
Next, we analyze the uncle and nephew rewards associ-
ated with the target block. We begin with the special case
of (4, 1) → (3, 1) before discussing the general case. We
consider the following three subcases.
1) Subcase 1: The pool mines a subsequent block and
references the target block. See Fig. 14 for an illustra-
tion. (This happens with probability α.) By Lemma 1,
the target block will become an uncle block, receiving
an uncle reward of Ku(3). The pool will receive a
nephew reward.
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Figure 14. The subcase 1 of Case 7, in which the pool mines a subsequent
block, references the target block and eventually wins the associated nephew
reward.
2) Subcase 2: Some honest miners mine a subsequent
block on the target block. (This happens with proba-
bility β(1−γ).) Then, the pool will publish its private
branch. See Fig. 15 for an illustration. To determine
the uncle and nephew rewards, we need to consider
the following subsubcases.
Subsubcase 1: Some honest miners mine a new block
and references the target block. See Fig. 16. This
C2
B1A1 C1 D1
A2
B1A1 C1
A2B2
D1
B2
Selfish miners' secret block
Selfish miners' published block
Honest miners' block
Uncle blocks' reference
Figure 15. The subcase 2 of Case 7, in which some honest miners mine
a subsequent block on the target block.
subsubcase happens with probability β(1 − γ)β. The
honest miner receives a nephew reward, and the target
block receives an uncle reward of Ku(3) since the
distance is 3.
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Figure 16. The subsubcase 1 of Case 7, in which some honest miners
mine a block in state (0, 0) and win the associated nephew reward.
Subsubcase 2: The pool mines a new block and keeps
it private. This subsubcase happens with probability
β(1 − γ)α. Now, if the new block later becomes a
regular block (with probability α + αβ + β2γ due to
the discussion for Case 2), the pool will receive a
nephew reward and the target block will receive an
uncle reward of Ku(3). Otherwise, if the new block
later becomes a stale block (with probability β2(1−γ)
due to the discussion for Case 2), some honest miners
will receive a nephew reward and the target block will
again receive an uncle reward of Ku(3).
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Figure 17. The subsubcase 2 of Case 7, in which the selfish pool mines
a new block in state (0, 0), but finally loses to the nephew reward.
3) Subcase 3: Some honest miners mine a subsequent
block not on the target block. (This happens with
probability βγ.) In terms of the analysis of uncle and
nephew rewards, Subcase 3 is the same as Subcase 2.
To sum up, for the special case of (4, 1) → (3, 1), the
target block will always receive an uncle reward of Ku(3).
As for the nephew reward, one can draw a tree diagram
summarizing all the subcases discussed above and conclude
that it will be received by honest miners with probability
β2(1 + αβ(1 − γ)) and by the pool with probability 1 −
β2(1 + αβ(1 − γ)).
Here, we note that the probability β2(1 + αβ(1 − γ))
(that the nephew reward will be received by honest miners)
can be explained as follows. First, the honest miners have
to “push” the system state from (3, 1) to (0, 0) while the
pool mines nothing. (Otherwise, the pool will receive the
nephew reward by Lemma 1.) This happens with probability
β. Second, starting from (0, 0), the honest miners can win
the nephew reward with probability β(1+αβ(1− γ)). This
interpretation allows us to analyze the general case.
First, the honest miners have to “push” the system state
from (i − j, 1) to (0, 0) while the pool mines nothing.
This happens with probability βi−j−2. Second, starting
from (0, 0), the honest miners can win the nephew reward
with probability β(1 + αβ(1 − γ)). Therefore, the nephew
reward will be received by honest miners with probability
βi−j−1(1 + αβ(1 − γ)) and by the pool with probability
1− βi−j−1(1 + αβ(1 − γ)).
Case 8: (i, j)
βγ
→ (0, 0) with i− j = 2 and j ≥ 1
In this case, some honest miners mine the target block.
Then, the pool publishes its private branch. Now, the target
block becomes an uncle block. Similar to Case 7, the target
block will receive an uncle reward of Ru(2), and the nephew
reward will be received by honest miners with probability
β(1+αβ(1−γ)) and by the pool with probability 1−β(1+
αβ(1 − γ)).
Case 9: (2, 0)
β
→ (0, 0) with i ≥ 2
In this case, some honest miners mine the target block.
Then, the pool publishes its private branch. The remaining
discussion is the same as Case 8.
Case 10: (i, 0)
β
→ (i, 1) with i ≥ 3
In this case, some honest miners mine the target block.
Then, the pool publishes its first unpublished block. By
Lemma 1, the target block will eventually become an uncle
block. Similar to the discussion for Case 7, we conclude
that the target block will receive an uncle reward of Ku(i),
and the nephew reward will be received by honest miners
with probability of βi−1(1 + αβ(1 − γ)) and by the pool
with probability 1− βi−1(1 + αβ(1 − γ)).
Case 11: (i, j)
β(1−γ)
→ (i, j+1) with i− j ≥ 3 and j ≥ 1
In this case, some honest miners mine the target block.
Then, the pool publishes its first unpublished block. By
Lemma 1, the target block will eventually become a stale
block. Since its parent block is not in the system main chain,
the target block will not be an uncle block.
Case 12: (i, j)
β(1−γ)
→ (0, 0) with i− j = 2 and j ≥ 1
In this case, some honest miners mine the target block.
Then, the pool publishes its private branch. Similar to Case
11, the target block will neither be a regular block nor an
uncle block.
